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Resistance and repression in India:
the hunger strike at the Andaman
cellular jail in 1933
Pramod Kumar Srivastava
I know destruction awaits him,
Who first rises
Against the oppressors yoke;
My fate is sealed and closed,
But tell me where and when
Without victims
Was ever freedom won?
For my native land I perish
I feel it and I know it
And in my heart O Holy father
My far star I bliss! [Pushkin]1
1 Hunger strikes had become popular with both the political streams of the nationalist
movement of India -Gandhi’s non-violent platform and the militant nationalists terrorist
movement. There were several instances of hunger strikes by political prisoners, convicts
and detenus in the mainland prisons and in the penal settlement at the Andaman Islands.
Some of  the Lahore Conspiracy Case prisoners at  Hazaribagh Jail  in 1918 resorted to a
hunger strike to protest against the nature of their incarceration. At about the same time
there were hunger strikes in Bengal and Bihar among detenus2. The militants nationalists
of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA) arrested in the 2ndLahore Conspiracy
Case, used hunger strike as a political weapon to protest that their grievances in the
prisons were not being redressed. Yatindra Nath Das, a member of HSRA, had died on 13th
September 1929 in Lahore prison after 63 days of hunger strike3. Mahatma Gandhi, used
the fast, as a non-violent weapon, to teach moral principles to his followers4. Later, he
also used it as an effective non-violent weapon to enforce his own followers in particular
and the people of India in general. Whereas Gandhi’s fasts were an individual act of a
spiritual kind, the hunger strikes were mostly collective and united efforts to challenge
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jail  authorities  and  the  colonial  government.  However,  none  of  these  compared  in
significance with the forty-five day old hunger strike of 1933 at Andaman Islands. By
paying the price of three lives this hunger strike kept the spirit of anti-colonial struggle
alive in the lull after the failure of Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930. It also
exposed the nature of colonial disciplining of political prisoners, the negligence of jail
authorities  during the forced feeding of  the hunger strikers,  and the essence of  the
transportation  policy  of  the  Government  of  India.  The  colonial  bureaucracy  was
determinated that the use of hunger strike as a technique of insubordination should be
discouraged by not granting any concessions, yet it was forced to accept a humiliating
compromise.
2 The hunger strikes by the political prisoners in twentieth century were an extension of
the outburst of the militant resistance movement against the British colonialism. It is not
a coincidence that the idea of hunger strike originated in the cellular jail only after the
first generation of militant nationalists were transported to Andaman Islands. Though
the nature of penal settlement remained almost same throughout nineteenth century the
meaningful  protest  was  not  witnessed  before  1912.  The idea  of  hunger  strike  was
nevertheless rooted in the inherent contradictions between the theory and practice of
colonial  bureaucracy  in  disciplining  ordinary  convicts  and  political  prisoners.  Singh
noted, «unlike transported convicts who were kept in the cellular jail for short terms,
political prisoners at Andamans, in the early decades of the 20th century, suffered the
dual punishment of transportation and harsh imprisonment in the cellular jail for the
entire term of their sentence»5.
 
The penal settlement: Colonialism, Rebellion and
Repression
3 The idea of penal settlement originated in India with the beginning of colonialism, and
was abolished only after India achieved freedom from British rule. In view of Macaulay,
the  drafter  of Indian  Penal  Code  and  a  pioneer  of  the  colonial  prison  system,
transportation was significant «as a punishment for Indian criminals»6. It was viewed as
more painful and deterrent for Indians than for English criminals. The foremost objective
in transportation during the eighteenth century was the requirement of labour for the
exploitation of the natural resources of the islands where such penal settlements were
established. Hence convicts above 18 and below 40 years of age, and medically fit for hard
labour were chosen for such settlements. Sen has noted that in 1818, Stamford Raffles,
the Governor of Sumatra, had indicated to the Government of India, that the employment
of prisoners in various forms of labour might enable a self-sustaining colony7. However,
since  1858 penal  settlement  for  Indian convicts  was limited to  the Andaman Islands
alone.The rules and regulations framed in 1827 for Benkoolen or Penang were applied here
as well.
4 The revolt of 1857 in India created a problem about accomodating the large number of
mutineers in the mainland jails. This was the direct and immediate context in which a
penal settlement was established at Port Blair. Thereafter, a large number of the Wahabi 
rebels were transported. Yet by 1889, a Committee sent by Government of India, held,
«the punishment of transportation was not deterrent»; and prophesied, «before long this
form of punishment would cease to exist». They said that transportation, «was decidedly
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retributive and as such opposed to the fundamental principles of modern penology»8.
Nevertheless transportation to Andamans continued and in fact, the Government of India
began constructing a cellular jail in 1896, which was completed in 1910. It was a well built
and scientifically planned three storeyed fine building standing on a bold promontory
close to the sea, about 100 feet above the sea level9. It had seven wings with 690 cells
connected from a central tower. The central tower had an additional storey to provide
room for watch guards10.
5 The rapid growth of the militant nationalist movement against British colonialism during
early years of the twentieth century added one more factor to the existing objective of
penal  settlement.  It  was  a  new  situation  in  which  the  colonial  authorities  «seemed
apprehensive of confining the nationalists on the mainland where they could spread their
‘dangerous’  ideas»11.  Thereafter,  the  deportation  of  political  prisoners  to  the  penal
settlement at Andaman Islands increased manifold. The division on the basis of political
and non-political prisoners at Andamans was made in 1909 when Sir J.  P. Hewett the
governor of United Provinces requested the transportation of Hoti Lal Verma and Ram
Hari,  the editors of the Urdu weekly «Swarajya», published from Allahabad,  who were
convicted and sentenced to seven years of transportation. In 1906 the Government had
suspended  the  deportation  of  term  convicts,  so  his  request  was  turned  down.  The
government  reopened the  transportation of  political  prisoners  sentenced for  various
terms after the judgement of the Alipore Bomb case, which pronounced that there was a
conspiracy to overthrow the British government in India12. In 1910, the convicts of the
Khulna conspiracy case and the Alipore conspiracy case were transported,  so too was
Damodar Vinayak Savarkar, for the first and second Nasik conspiracy case. He would later
write Story of Transportation for Life about this sentence.
6 The arrival of so many political prisoners in cellular jail  provided an opportunity for
them to unite against the disciplinary regime of the colonial prison administration. This
resulted  into  a  series  of  hunger  strikes,  work  stoppages,  and  rumours  of  bomb
manufacture by political prisoners in 1912. All such disturbances at the settlement were,
in fact,  an expansion of  the anti-colonial  resistance movement in the mainland.  The
propaganda impact of this minor resistance movement became a point of concern for the
colonial government. The publication of prisoner’s letters in the vernacular press, mass
demonstration at the mainland about the treatment of political prisoners in the cellular
jail,  and the  embarrassing  questions  in  the  Imperial  Legislative  Assembly  forced the
Government of India to send Sir Reginald Craddock to make an inquiry to prove that
political prisoners were not unduly tormented in the Andamans13.  Craddock’s findings
were  described  as  «neither  impartial  nor  particularly  rigorous».  The  colonial  jail
administration  of  cellular  jail  was  completely  exonerated.  Yet  Satadru  Sen  says  the
inquiry gave an impression of «transparency» and «official concern», and «these were
central to the politics of surveillance in the colonial context»14. During the First World
War 77 convicts of the First Lahore Conspiracy case, connected with the well-known Ghadr
movement, were transported. There were 133 political prisoners in Andamans between
1910 to 192015.
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Transportation policy: The segregation of dangerous
ideas
7 In theory the penal settlement was abandoned in 1921 after the transportation policy of
the  Government  of  India  was  announced  by  Sir  William  Vincent  in  the  Legislative
Assembly on 11th March 1921. Sir Vincent said that the government of India had decided
to abandon the penal  settlement but  abandonment had to be gradual,  as  it  involved
12,000 to 15,000 prisoners. He also mentioned that orders have already been issued for
the  immediate  return  of  «all  political  prisoners  and  female  prisoners  not  married
locally.» The local governments were directed not to send more criminals to Andamans.
However, in November 1921 owing to the overcrowding of jails in India, and a consequent
deterioration in administration and discipline and grave danger of large scale epidemics,
it  was  found  necessary  to  re-open  transportation  to  the  Andamans.  Even  so,  the
Government of India emphasised that the transportation of females, political offenders
and prisoners suspected of a tendency to unnatural vice would be absolutely prohibited16.
8 In pursuance of this policy, the convicts who had «suffered in health» or had proven
«incorrigible in conduct» were transferred to the jails in India. Transfers from India were
severely curtailed and almost completely stopped. The remaining convicts were given
various inducements to stay on as free settlers, viz. relaxation of conditions, grant of
«ticket of leave» after a short period of probation and facilities for getting the convicts’
wives from India17. In 1921, when Government decided to close the settlement the convict
population numbered 11,532; by December, 1926, their number declined to 7,74018. This
reduction resulted in a shortage of labour so that the local authorities initiated a process
of obtaining volunteer convicts from Indian jails19.
9 In 1932 the Government of Bengal proposed to transfer about 100 Terrorist (Militant
Nationalist) convicts, including three women, to the Andamans from the jails of Bengal.
The Government of Bengal regarded the proposal as an essential both to maintaining
discipline in jails and deterring terrorism. It argued «that other Indian provinces were
unwilling to take detenus and there was, therefore no alternative to the Andamans»20.
The Government of India supporting the proposal, said the prisoners to be transferred
would be «composed of persons serving sentences of transportation for terrorist outrages
and sentences of rigorous imprisonment for similar offences».  The 3 women convicts
proposed to be transported to Andamans were those concerned in the shooting of Mr.
Stevens and in the attempt on Sir Stanley Jackson. The «transportation» prisoners would
be placed in the cellular jail and the others would serve out their sentences in ordinary
jail,  just as in an Indian jail.  «They will  all  be kept entirely separate,  from the other
prisoners in the Andamans and out of contact with the settlement. The 3 women will be
kept entirely separate with no danger of association with other convicts»21.
10 Since the proposals of transportation were against the declared policy of the colonial
government it was found essential to justify it. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sir
Charles Tegart, the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, found no legal objections.
«Prisoners  may be  removed to  any Indian prison» Tegart  rationalised,  «by an order
passed under section 29 of the Prisoners Act and the Andamans is a part of British India».
So far the declared policy of the Government of India, in regard to the total abandonment
of the penal settlement was concerned, he argued, «it  will  not be the first time that
transportation to the Andamans has been re-opened since the announcement of 1921»22.
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According to Tegart there was no legal objection to the transportation of prisoners who
were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment because they would be treated in all respects as
though they were serving their sentences in an inland prison. There remained the fact
that the Secretary of State and the Government of India had always, since 1921, agreed
that the transportation of  women and political  prisoners to the Andamans would be
prohibited in future. Regarding the transportation of political prisoners the Secretary of
State argued: «The Government of India, however, point out that for many years they
have refused to recognise the term ‘political prisoners’ which finds no place in the new
Classification of  Rules.  Moreover,  they are  strongly  of  opinion that  no consideration
should be shown to persons convicted of offences connected with murderous conspiracies
merely because a political  motive is  involved»23.  Regarding the transportation of  the
women convicts, the Government of India said, «unless measures are adopted which will
be regarded as a deterrent against women terrorists, there was a serious danger that
women will continue, and will be encouraged, to commit such crimes». The Government
of India stated that adequate measures would be taken for the maintenance, health and
guarding of the prisoners, and suggested that it would probably be convenient to treat
them  all  as  «B»  class  prisoners.  The  cost  of  maintenance  was  to  be  borne  by  the
Government of Bengal. The proposal of the Government of India was accepted in Britain,
the Secretary of State stating that he had received it  with regret but recognised the
necessity  for  sanctioning  the  measures.  However,  only  those  prisoners  were  to  be
transported from Bengal who were convicted of offences in connection with terrorist
crimes24.
11 The first batch of 25 prisoners from Bengal was sent on 15th August 193225. The decision to
despatch a first batch of prisoners was taken in extraordinary haste26. Up till May 1933,
four batches of political prisoners were sent to Port Blair from Bengal and other parts of
India via Alipore Central jail27. There were 100 political prisoners in cellular jail in March
193328. The Government of India also confirmed that 100 political prisoners from Bengal
were transported up to 25th May 193329. Since they were transported for their nationalist
ideas and not for the purpose of labour it is not surprising that the age factor was not
taken into account.  At least six prisoners – Anand Prasad Gupta,  Sahairam Das,  Fakir
Chandra  Sen,  Haripada  Bhattacharjee,  Sudhendu  Bikash  Dastidar  and  Hira  Mohan
Chatterjee – when transported to the Andamans were youths below 18 years of age30.
12 However, the Government of India did not rest content with removing political prisoners
from Bengal alone. On the basis of the three Reports received from the Government of
Bihar  and Orissa  in  193031,  193132 and 1932 33,  the  Government  of  India  asked on 3rd
November 1932 for approval of the transfer of five terrorist convicts from Bihar and to
the Andamans cellular  jail  and for  discretion to transfer  terrorist  convicts  from any
province to the Andamans. The Government of India said that the transfer of convicts to
the Andamans jail had the great advantage of deterrence, of preventing escape and of
preventing communication with accomplices outside the prison walls. It also contended
that since they were proposing to send only long term convicts to the Andamans, the risk
of further contamination in the cellular jail was most certainly outweighed by the risks
involved in keeping them in jail in their homeland. It was also argued that there was
plenty of room in the Andamans cellular jail, with its 700 cells and a normal population of
not more than 300. It declared that it was impossible now to suggest that the Andamans
were an «unhealthy» place for convicts34.
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13 The office of the Secretary of State was well aware that there was actually no serious
outbreak of militancy in Bihar between 1930 and 193235 yet it  not only approved the
transfer of 5 Bihari convicts to Andamans, but also agreed to vest the Government of
India with discretion in regard to further transfers of terrorist convicts from Bihar or
other provinces36. Thereafter in the period up to 25 May 1933, six political convicts from
Bihar and Orissa and eight from Punjab and Delhi were transported.
14 The total number of political prisoners transported to Andaman on the eve of hunger
strike was 11737.
15 The total number of political prisoners at the time of hunger strike was 11238.
16 The Government of India had given the undertaking, «that adequate measures for the
maintenance, health and guarding of the prisoners will be taken and that it will probably
be found most convenient to treat them all as «B» class prisoners»39. Yet in disregard of
this,  many  of  the  transferred  political  prisoners  were  not  only treated  as  «C»  class
prisoners but were subjected to hard labour and severe punishments for indiscipline. One
example of hard labour was the grinding of 30 pounds of oil everyday from an Oil Mill to
which  the  convict  was  tied  down in  place  of  bullocks.  Choir  pounding  was  another
common  labour  task.  Apart  from  solitary  confinement,  another  typical  punishment
included  a  standing  position  for  several  hours  with  both  hands  handcuffed.  The
newspaper Jnanananda reported «The Division III  prisoners were given very bad diet,
simply unsuitable for human consumption.  They were not supplied with any light at
night in their cells. No money was accepted at the jail gate as personal cash in the name
of any class of prisoners, in some cases money orders from relatives were even refused
and money was withheld,  if  they were any.  They were not allowed to get their food
cooked in a joint kitchen with Division II prisoners»40.
 
Hunger strike: A Weapon of Political Resistance
17 The arrival of the militant nationalist prisoners from Bengal encouraged the prisoners to
present a united resistance to the jail administration. On January 3rd, 1933 seven of the
political prisoners-Bimal Kumar Das Gupta, Sushil Kumar Das Gupta, Probodh Chandra
Roy, Prabir Goswami, Bimlendu Chakravorty, Barindra Kumar Ghosh41, and Subodh Roy-
went  on  hunger  strike.  This  was  the  second  hunger  strike  in  the  cellular  jail.  The
prisoners outlined 15 demands including, «Better rice and vegetables for C class; Special
dietary for vegetarians; Flat-faced pots for night urinals in place of lotas; Emola soap for
all prisoners; Better hospital arrangements; Latrine arrangements to be improved. Each
compartment to be screaned off; Bed-sheets and towels for C class as well as for B class»42.
The strike  lasted from January 3rd to  January 9 th 1933.  The condition of  the hunger
strikers remained stable so forced feeding was not required but disciplinary action was
taken against them on the orders of the Chief Commissioner43.
18 The historic third hunger strike commenced four months after the failure of the second
hunger strike. Barindra Kumar Ghosh, a participant in the both hunger strikes of 1933,
recalled: «We decided to commence next strike after arrival of another batch. After the
arrival of B.K. Dutta and Bhupal Ghosh we gave an ultimatum of one month to redress
their grievances. But the government said that nothing could be done. Thereafter one-
month time was given to each of us to think who shall take part in the hunger strike
because  after  beginning it  once it  was  not  to  be  broken.  Fifty-six  prisoners  were in
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division three.  Twenty-three of  them participated in the hunger strike.  Rest of  them
decided not to work. It began on 12th May 1933»44.
19 There was no unanimity among all the political prisoners over the issue of beginning a
hunger strike in cellular jail.  Dhirendra Nath Choudhury, a participant in the hunger
strike recalled that there were only 15-16 political prisoners before the arrival of his
batch of  thirty-five  prisoners.  When they decided to begin a  hunger strike all  those
present before the arrival of his batch refused to participate. They said they were few in
number, and that as convicts for life they would have to stay on while the instigators of
the hunger strike, the term prisoners, would leave after some time. Therefore, it was
decided to wait for the arrival of other comrades. Till then they kept on working and
quarrelling  with  officers.  Thereafter,  another  group  of  six  prisoners  arrived,  whose
names Mr. Choudhury did not want to reveal. They too refused to participate saying they
were not familiar with the conditions prevailing in the cellular jail. In addition there was
no communication with the mainland so, no one would set to know about the hunger
strike.  Subsequently  Shiv  Verma,  Batukeshwar  Dutta  and  others  of  second  Lahore
conspiracy case arrived from Punjab but they too refused. Here there is a discrepancy
between the version of Mr Choudhury and Bejoy Kumar Sinha. According to Sinha, Shiv
Verma and Jaideo Kapoor arrived on 14th June45.  Therefore,  there was no question of
refusal  from  them.  Shiv  Verma  and  Jaideo  Kapoor  give  the  same  date  for  their
transportation. However, the records of the Chief Commissioner of Andaman Islands put
Shiv Verma, Jaideo Kapoor and Bejoy Kumar Sinha as present in the Cellular Jail on 25th
May 193346. The instigators did have to wait for some more time till a group arrived from
Bengal  who  were  ready  for  the  struggle.  Finally,  an  ultimatum  was  given  to  jail
administration before beginning the hunger strike47. The new arrivals were unaware of
the prisoner’s grievances in the cellular jail yet prompted by nationalist ideas they united
with their comrades in the hunger strike.
20 The condition of political prisoners in the cellular jail had not improved since the first
hunger strike and Craddock’ s visit in 1912-1913. Yet no such resistance had taken shape
in  the  cellular  jail  over  the  last  two  decades.  The  hope  of  constitutional  remedies
generated during First World War, the non-violent movement of 1919-1922 under the
leadership of Gandhi and abandonment of transportation of political prisoners after 1921
had introduced certain inconsistencies  in the resistance movement.  Yet  the mode of
disciplining political prisoners in the settlement remained draconian. Achyut Ghatak, a
participant in the hunger strike, recalled: «When we arrived Andamans no one of us could
think of returning back alive. It was a jungle. No sooner we were in the jail compound it
appeared as if we were in a hell. I went in the third batch. Those who had arrived in the
first and the second batch had made enough preparations. They were waiting for the
arrival  of  the  third  batch  to  commence  their  joint  struggle  against  the  jail
Superintendent. There was no arrangement of electricity. Mosquitoes were plenty but
mosquito net was not provided. Food was deplorable. In those conditions we all decided
that it was preferable to die sooner by observing hunger strike than to die slowly»48.
Vidhu Bhusan Sen, another participant in the hunger strikes mentioned: «There were big
scorpions in the cells. Its biting resulted into high fever. In the morning we were provided
Lapsi (an item made up of boiled rice and water) without salt. Food was worst. I was class
3 prisoner»49. Dhirendra Nath Choudhury, a convict of Maniktala Dacoity Case, narrated:
«Cells were in deplorable condition… A number of scorpions were in the cells. In each cell
one convict was incarcerated. The cells were 10 feet long and 6 feet broad. In each cell
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there was an iron door and a small window. The cells were so dark that one could see only
after shutting his eyes for a while. We were provided very dirty food to eat…We were
given the work of coir pounding»50. On the issue of demanding better conditions in the
cellular jail, militant nationalists in fact commenced a new struggle in jail. The demands
of  hunger  strikers  included  light  in  their  cell  till  10  p.m.,  weekly  and  monthly
newspapers, right of petitioning both central and local Governments, an extensive and
varied diet including a choice of vegetables and tooth powder, tooth paste and sandals,
etc51.
21 After the ultimatum was lapsed the political prisoners began their hunger strike in the
cellular jail on 12th May 193352. The jail authorities held that B. K. Dutta and Kamal Nath,
were the prime movers behind the strike and they segregated them from the rest of the
hunger strikers who were in yard No. 553. The other leaders of the hunger strike were
those who had participated in the hunger strike of January 3rd, 1933.
22 The objective of  the hunger strike was not  limited to protest  against  the deplorable
conditions to which ‘C’ class convicts were subjected in the cellular jail. It was a part of
the  nationalist  resistance  movement  going  on  the  mainland  since  beginning  of  the
twentieth century. It is not surprising therefore that the hunger strike did not remain
confined to the ‘C’ class prisoners. Soon six «B» class convicts also joined. However, the
demands  of  ‘C’  class  and ‘B’  class  hunger  strikers  were  not  identical.  The  «B»  class
convicts were demanding a supply of newspapers from many countries at Government’s
expense,  permission  to  receive  money  and  the  right  to  petition  Central  and  Local
Governments54. Yet, the cellular jail administration put about the idea that compliance
with the demands of the ‘C’ class prisoners would place them in the same position as ‘B’
class convicts55.
23 In fact, nowhere in Indian Jails were ordinary ‘C’ class convicts kept in such deplorable
conditions.  The provisions of  the jail  code were grossly neglected by the cellular jail
administration. Article 466 of the Jail Code maintained: «A kerosene Hurricane lamp or
other light suspended from an iron rod, eight or nine feet from the ground shall be kept
burning in every sleeping ward». The next provision said: «It is the duty of the patrolling
officer and of both the warders and convict watchmen to see that all the night lamps are
kept  burning brightly»56.  Their  demand of «an extensive and varied diet  including a
choice of vegetables», was not contrary to the article 1052 of the Jail Code regarding the
sanction of diet for the ‘C’ class convicts. The article sanctioned Rice and Salt (well-known
in jails as ‘Lapshi’) for early morning meal and Rice, Dal and Vegetables for other meals. In
addition it provided, «in all jails, ration of fish at the rate of _ chattack per head shall be
given on alternate day at one or other of the daily meals…Meat can be substituted for fish
provided the cost remains the same»57.  As against it the diet supplied to the ‘C’ class
convicts was simply unsuitable for human consumption. They were forced to consume
rice «mixed with varieties of grains and small stones». In the name of vegetables they
were given practically leaves and grasses. Neither fish nor meat in lieu of fish was ever
supplied to them.
24 The ‘B’ class prisoners were not supplied with any weekly newspapers or magazines as
approved by the Jail Code: «Periodical news may be published in English or in Bengali in
the form of a Jail  Newspaper at  the expense of  the Government and supplied to the
literate prisoners in both divisions I and II. If no Jail newspaper is published or if it is not
possible to undertake its production prisoners in division I and II shall be supplied with a
few copies  of  a  weekly  newspaper  from a  list  of  newspapers  to  be  approved by the
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
8
Government»58. In the jails of mainland Bengal ‘B’ class prisoners were supplied with the «
Englishman», «Statesman» and «Sanjibani». They could also subscribe to these papers at
their own expense59.
25 The Cellular Jail administration accepted no money at the jail gate as personal cash in the
name of any class of prisoners. In some cases money orders from relatives were refused
or withheld from them. Yet, the Jail Code clearly established the prisoner’s right to have
money as personal cash in custody60. The prisoners, at their own cost or that of their
friends, were allowed to have fruits and uncooked food including milk on festivals at the
discretion of the superintendent61. They were allowed to observe DurgaPuja, SaraswatiPuja,
DoleJatra,  Idul-Fitr,  Iduzzoha,  Mohurrum,  Christmas,  Good  Friday  and  King  Emperors’
Birthday62. The Jail Code even allowed prisoners to see a visitor once a fortnight in the
case of a Division I prisoner or once a month in the case of Division II prisoner63. However,
the Andaman prisoners were allowed to see a visitor only once in six months.
 
The forced feeding: The Repression and the Safe
Custody
26 On 17th May 1933 the hunger strikers began to be force fed. The legality of forced feeding
was established with an amendment in the Bengal Jail Code, 1910, whereby a prisoner
could be fed «in such manner as  the circumstances appear to the medical  officer to
warrant»64. There was also a direction of the Government of India, dated the 23rd October
1922,  addressed  to  all  Local  Governments  and  Administrations  regarding  «Forcible
feeding of hunger strikers»65. It mentioned a judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in the
case of Leigh vs. Gladstone, related to an action claiming damages for assault and for an
injunction, brought by a suffragette against the Home Secretary, the Governor of the
Prison and the Medical Officer of the Prison. The Lord Chief Justice observed, «It was the
duty, both under the rules and apart from the rules, of the officials to preserve the health
and lives of the prisoners, who were in the custody of the Crown. If they forcibly fed the
plaintiff when it was not necessary, the defendants ought to pay damages»66. In the light
of this judgment the Government of India made it clear that the jail  superintendents
could employ forced feeding on the argument of «safe custody»67.
27 The procedure of the forced feeding was a scientifically devised method recommended by
a Committee of medical officers, which met at Lahore in 1929 to advise on the treatment
of hunger strikers in the Lahore Conspiracy Case. It was a tortuous procedure employed in
the garb of a policy of «safe custody» of prisoners. The prisoner on hunger strike was
forced to lie down on a low bed, with his head slightly raised on a pillow. Thereafter,
three or four attendants would hold his head and limbs,  while the doctor inserted a
rubber  «catheter»  through  the  nostril  into  the  gullet  and  so  to  the  stomach.  The
nourishment included milk with sugar and raw eggs; and the amount given was 10 oz to
1½ lb68. Since hunger strikers were determined to resist forced feeding each procedure
took  several  hours,  which  resulted  into  a  struggle  between  hunger  striker  and  the
attendants.  According  to  Achyut  Ghatak,  a  participant  in  the  hunger  strike,  hunger
strikers devised a remarkable way of resisting forced feeding. During nasal insertion of
the catheter tube they would cough heavily to shift the tube’s end from glut to mouth and
hold it tightly between their teeth to foil forced feeding69. It was not unlikely that use of
physical strength by either party could cause the catheter tube to pass into the lungs
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instead  of  the  stomach and  cause  severe  pneumonia  and  even  a  painful  death.  The
colonial fear of «dangerous ideas» was so intense that such a tortuous procedure not only
found the sanction of the legal system but the element of dehumanisation involved in the
operation was overlooked.
28 The death of three hunger strikers after forced feeding confirmed the duplicity of the
policy of «safe custody» upon which forced feeding was sanctioned. Mahabir Singh, a
Lahore Conspiracy convict, who arrived at Andamans from Madras jail in January 1933,
died at 12.24 a.m. on 18th morning, within twenty-four hours of forced feeding. Yet the
jail  authorities  denied  any  carelessness  in  the  procedure.  In  his  telegram  to  the
Government of India the Chief Commissioner of Andaman Islands stated: «Post mortem
examination shows that  death was  due to  shock and not  to  any carelessness  in  the
administration of food. Three other convicts show sign of serious weakness, but condition
of remainder is quite satisfactory»70.
29 Up to the 16th Mahabir Singh’s  condition was satisfactory,  though he was weak.  The
Senior Medical Officer saw him on the 17th morning and artificial feeding was considered
necessary. At 11 a.m. 24 ounces of milk and one of sugar were given by nasal feeding.
Mahabir Singh resisted very violently both while the tube was being inserted and while
the milk was being poured down. His condition became bad – pulse quick, respiration
difficult and hurried, and cold sweat on the forehead – at I p.m. his body was somewhat
cold and displayed evident signs of shock. At 4 p.m. he complained of tightness of the
chest and difficulty of  breathing.  The Senior Medical  Officer saw him and prescribed
treatment. He saw him again at 7.30 p.m. and noticed signs of collapse. He sank gradually
and death occurred at 12.24 a.m.71.
30 According  to  the  Chief  Commissioner  the  post  mortem examination showed no sign
either of  «external  or internal  injury» to his  body as  a  result  of  actual  operation of
feeding. His resistance, which was more violent than that offered by any other convict, in
his weakened state caused a severe shock to his system and led to his collapse. «I am quite
satisfied» said the Chief Commissioner, «that all due precautions were taken from the
moment that forcible feeding was decided upon and,  as stated above,  Senior Medical
Officer saw the patient at this time and twice again in the course of the day»72. However,
the report of the Chief Commissioner about his death was later debated in Council of
State73.
31 Although,  the Government of  India received information about the death of  Mahabir
Singh on 18th May 1933 it did not issue a press communiqué but news leaked out. Another
hunger striker Vidhu Bhusan Sen was hospitalised for injury in his lungs. He had started
bleeding through his nostrils74. Mankrishna Nama Das, a Bengali political prisoner, died of
pneumonia on the morning of 26th May. He began participating in the hunger strike on
the 16th May, and on 17th it was decided to feed him artificially. On the 19th instant he was
admitted to hospital with lobar pneumonia. Throughout his illness he gave no trouble
whatever, and the Senior Medical Officer assured the Chief Commissioner that his death
was due to natural causes and was in no way accelerated by his abstinence from food for
one day. The Chief Commissioner reported: «His case diary will be posted. There is now
only one convict suffering from pneumonia... Number of hunger strikers is now 39. They
are offering less resistance everyday to forcible feeding and the Senior Medical Officer
considers their condition, with one or two exceptions, to be quite satisfactory. Strike has
had no effect whatever on the ordinary convicts in the jail»75. According to the Senior
Medical Officer, «pneumonia started in consequence of reduced power of resistance to
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
10
illness caused by hunger-strike and its progress was in no way accelerated by forcible
feeding»76. The report of the Medical Officer on Mankrishna Nama Das was contradicted
by Vinayak Vithal Kalikar, in the Council of State: «He started hunger strike on the 16th;
food was administered to him through the mouth without resistance on the 17th and on
the 19th he was admitted to the hospital with double pneumonia. This is the statement
issued.  It  is  stated that he took whatever was given to him, he gave no trouble and
ultimately  he  died  on  the  26th…  there  is  some  link  which  we  do  not  find  in  the
communiqué and which can not explain away the circumstances»77.
32 After the death of two hunger strikers the Government of India considered it necessary to
issue a press communiqué on 28th May in which it repeated that Mahabir Singh had not
died «as a result of the operation of feeding (…). The patient’s resistance in his weakened
state caused a severe shock to his system and led to his collapse and death». On the death
of Mankrishna Nam Das the press communiqué stated: «His death was due to natural
causes and was in no way accelerated by his abstinence from food for one day»78.  It
accepted that the number of  hunger strikers climbed up to 39 by 28th May.  Another
political  prisoner  Mohit  Mohan  Maitra  convicted  in  connection  with  the  terrorist
movement in Bengal  joined the hunger strike on 12th May and died of  double lobar
pneumonia on the 28th May. It was again said that his vitality was impaired by the hunger
strike79.
33 The  news  about  the  death  on  a  third  prisoner  had  travelled  even  before  the  press
communiqué issued by the Government of India.  The citizens of Calcutta organised a
protest meeting in the Albert Hall on 30th May, presided over by Santosh Kumar Bose, the
City Mayor. The first Resolution read: «This meeting of the citizens of Calcutta has learnt
with great concern and sorrow the news of the continued hunger-strike of the 39 political
prisoners in the Cellular Jail at the Andamans and of the death of Sjts. Mahabir Singh of
Lahore,  Mankrishna  Namdas  of  Mymensingh and  Mohit  Mohan Maitra  of  Calcutta and
demands an immediate and open enquiry into the circumstances leading to the deaths
and hunger-strike».  Another  Resolution strongly  protested against  the  re-opening of
Andaman cellular jail for the deportation of political prisoners80.
34 The number of hunger strikers reached 45 on 5th June with one exception their condition
was reported to be satisfactory and a fair number of them were taking the feeding tube
voluntarily. In view of the uncertainty of the length of strike and of number of convicts
who might  eventually  join  it  the  Chief  Commissioner  demanded one  extra  Assistant
Surgeon81.  The  Government  of  India  asked  Lieutenant  Colonel  Barker,  O.B.E.,  I.M.S.,
Inspector General of Prisons, Punjab, who had special experience of hunger strikes, to
proceed to the Andamans for consultations about medical arrangements82.
35 On 13th June 1933 Azhar Ali, Amar Nath Dutt, B.V. Jadhav, S.C. Jog, B.N. Misra, S.C. Mitra,
Gaya Prasad Singh and K.B. Thampan, members of the Legislative Assembly met Sir Harry
Haig, the Home Member to discuss the situation arising out of the hunger-strike. Mr.
Jadhav  regretted  that  Government  had  not  thought  fit  to  publish  the  names  of  the
prisoners on hunger strikes, saying it would have relieved the anxiety of relatives. He also
raised questions about the effect of the climate in the Andamans upon the vitality of the
prisoners and about defective medical arrangements. Finally, he stated «that the Cellular
Jail had been closed and the transfer to it of these prisoners had arose suspicion in regard
to the motive of government which would best be allayed by the publication of periodic
statements and the holding of an impartial enquiry»83. Mr Mitra stated, «that he had been
advised by doctors that pneumonia might result from food being given unskilfully». Mr
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Jog and Mr Thampan asked «for an attempt to be made to meet their grievances»84. Sir
Harry  Haig  emphatically  refuted all  the  charges  and made it  clear  that  the  colonial
government was not ready to comply with the demands of the hunger strikers. Instead,
he informed them that Government was planning to send Lieutenant-Colonel Barker, one
of its officers from Punjab well experienced in dealing with such strikers85.
36 The Government of India was reluctant to publish the names of the political prisoners
who were on hunger strike,  but  the policy proved to be self-defeating.  It  raised the
anxiety of all  the families of political prisoners transferred to cellular jail.  The rising
temper of the public opinion attracted the attention of newspapers, political parties and
prominent citizens. The Free Press Journal of June 16 th claimed that Niranjan Sen Gupta,
Satish Prakashi, Sudhanshu Das Gupta, Nishi Kant Chowdhury, Narayan Roy, Bhupal Bose,
Batukeshwal (sic-Batukeshwar) Datta and Sushil Das Gupta were on hunger strike. Mr.
Vinayak Vithal Kalikar later mentioned these names in the Council of State, and was not
contradicted by Government86. In fact, all the prisoners mentioned by Free Press Journal
were on hunger strike87.
37 Lieutenant-Colonel  Barker arrived at  Port  Blair  on the afternoon of  June 14th 1933 88.
Barker found «58 terrorist prisoners on hunger strike in addition to 20 other terrorists
who refused to work but continued to take food»89. Of the 55 on hunger strike, 35 were
those who had been sent to Port Blair as B class prisoners, the rest were C class. The total
number of prisoners in the cellular jail was 112. Barker found that ten days before his
arrival «there had been a small outbreak of Influenza among them, and three were still
suffering. They were located separately at the top of one of the wings of the Jail, in rooms
made  by  the  conversion  of  two  cells  into  one  room.  Those  strikers  who  had  no
intercurrent  disease were located in small  groups in other  rows of  cells;  while  non-
striking terrorists continued to be treated in that part of the main hospital which had
been set apart for them».
38 After Barker’s arrival the 55 hunger-strikers were attended to by the S.M.O., Cap. Edge,
the new Assistant Surgn., Dr. Todd, four Sub.Asst. Surgeons, one compounder, a squad of
ordinary prisoners, one of whom assisted in the preparation of the food, and the others
detailed in groups of three and four to each Sub-Assistant Surgeon to hold the head and
limbs, of any prisoner who resisted artificial feeding.
39 Barker found that the rice supplied to C class prisoners was deficient in anti-Beri-Beri
constituents and that vegetables supplied were not up to the standard of most Indian
jails. He suggested the growing of more vegetables in the Hospital garden, and the use of
varieties of dhals (pulses) in place of only one kind of dhal. For night urinals in the cells,
he recommended a receptacle with a flat base and a wider top. He held that existing
latrines were good enough for C class prisoners but those for B class could be improved by
providing each seat with its own door in front for greater privacy. Barker concluded his
report by mentioning that not a single complaint was made to him by any of the 55
hunger strikers against the conduct of those in charge of them.
40 Lt. Col. Barker was known for his expertise in conducting forced feeding at Lahore Central
Jail.  The hunger strikers  were fed not  less  than three times a  day.  The prisoners in
hospital were fed at the interval of four hours. Barker reported that this system engaged
members of the staff at work practically all day long. In his opinion such frequent feeding
was both unnecessary and «contra-indicated», as every passage of a tube added to the
possibility of causing irritation of the nasal passages or «the mechanical carrying down of
germs  to  an  abraded surface  of  the  air  passage».  On the  other  hand,  if  the  patient
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struggled, there was also the possibility of exhaustion if this happened three or four times
a day. Barker’s Lahore experience had taught him that by increasing the size and nutritive
value of each feed it was quite possible to keep the strikers in health with two, or even
one, feed a day. The number of feeds was reduced to a maximum of two per day and the
volume of each feed was increased to one seer equivalent to roughly 2 lb.
41 In fact, Barker had also reduced the number of feeds as a tactic to force the prisoners to
abandon the hunger strike. He reported: «As the resistance put up by the strikers was, in
most cases, purely nominal, it was evident that the small and temporary discomfort of the
passage  of  a  tube  was  no  inducement  to  the  prisoners  to  give  up  their  strike».  He
therefore decided not only to reduce the number of feeds a day but in selected cases, to
omit the feed for a resisting prisoner on any one morning or evening. In other cases,
prisoners were informed that they would not be artificially fed that day and their food
was merely placed in their cells. A third batch had all water removed from their cells and
it was replaced by milk. Thirst, Barker wrote, «always causes a more urgent desire than
hunger».
42 Barker claimed that the results were not long in the showing.  In the first night,  the
hunger strikers, whose water had been replaced by milk, threw it out into the yard. «The
second night they left it untouched in their cells. On the next morning (20th.) they all
complained of weakness and of being ‘not so well’, and there was a general desire on the
part of every hunger striker to end the strike if it could be done with proper formality
and without too obvious a surrender. Those whose artificial feed had been omitted owing
to their threat of vigorous resistance took care next day not to resist for fear of losing
their rations». Yet until June 22nd none of the hunger strikers had given in. Therefore,
water was issued to those who had been supplied with milk only. However, the condition
of all the hunger strikers, including those suffering with influenza, was satisfactory.
43 «Artificial feeding», Barker proposed as a future course of action, «should be resorted to
(even if the patient is conscious) if the Medical Officer considers that it is the only means
whereby the prisoner can be kept alive. He declared «In the treatment of the hunger-
strikers  at  Port  Blair,  artificial  feeding was,  I  think,  started before  it  was  absolutely
necessary to save life. To put the case in another way, several of these prisoners could, in
my opinion, have continued to abstain from food for a further 3-4 days and yet have
recovered without artificial feeding had they, at the end of this period, consented to take
food by the normal method». Barker suggested the immediate isolation of strikers from
other prisoners to prevent the spread of such tacties. In certain cases he recommended
rectal  feeding  before  nasal  feeding.  In  case  of  nasal  feeding  he  recommended  prior
examination of the mouth, nose and throat and treatment if any infection was detected,
and regular treatment of the air passages by gargles, inhalations and, sprays. If there was
any inflammation of the throat or lungs artificial feeding immediately should be stopped.
In his opinion it was better to risk death by inanition rather than add to the risk of death
by diseases of the lungs. He also said the number of artificial feeds should be reduced to
the minimum required to keep the prisoner alive.
 
The power of spirit and official face saving
44 The physical endurance of the hunger strikers was being tried to the limit yet Barker’s
expertise was not showing any promising result. The spirit of resistance in the cellular
jail  was  not  scaling  down.  Public  agitation  on  the  mainland  was  mounting  and  the
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government was finding it difficult to justify its stand. The jail authorities were not in a
position to afford a single more casualty, especially in the presence of Lt.Colonel Barker.
Therefore,  the  jail  authorities  resorted to  a  honourable  compromise  and the hunger
strike was called off in the evening of 26th June90. Later, Sir Harry Haig, the Home Member
asserted in the Council of State that the hunger strike was abandoned unconditionally91.
However, Dhirendra Nath Choudhury gives a different account: «Chief Commissioner sent
Jail  Superintendent  to  negotiate  with  us.  The  Jail  Superintendent  told  us  that  Chief
Commissioner  would fulfil  all  our  demands.  He will  give  us  privileges  we never  had
dreamt. We told him that no individual could take a decision. Therefore, collect us at one
place. Thereafter we were brought on stretchers at one place with a warning to take a
decision immediately. We decided to terminate the hunger strike from that very day»92.
Sinha’s version also confirms that the hunger strike was not abandoned unconditionally93
.
45 This assessment also emerges from an evaluation of government’s actions taken within a
few months. Many of the grievances of the hunger strikers were redressed in January
1934 when the Chief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, framed rules, under
section  60  of  the  Prisons  Act  1894,  to  regulate  the  classification  and  treatment  of
convicted prisoners94. In the Council of State Mr. Kalikar, a member, made this point: «My
submission is  that  if  their  grievances  were  genuine-and it  seems that  some of  their
grievances were genuine because some of the grievances were redressed afterwards by
the Government -Government could have taken their grievances into account from the
beginning and avoided this difficult hunger strike which caused the death of these three
unfortunate prisoners. The grievances of these political prisoners were about proper diet,
supply  of  light,  newspapers  like  Statesman,  proper  and  timely  medical  aid  and
correspondence with their relatives and Government. Some of the grievances have been
remedied and I therefore submit that Government committed a blunder in not paying
attention to the grievances  of  these political  prisoners  in the beginning so that  this
catastrophe could have been easily avoided»95.
46 The  framing  of  the new  set  of  rules  overhauled  the  existing  conditions  of  political
prisoners in the cellular  jail.  It  was a  great  victory for  the hunger strikers.  In 1998,
Bankim Chakravarty, Dhirendra Nath Choudhury, Provot Chakravarty and Ram Chandra
Das all participants in the hunger strike recalled the changed atmosphere of cellular jail
after  the  abandonment  of  the  hunger  strike96.  The  concessions  included  the
establishment of a library, permission to play football, a common kitchen, political classes
and even the circulation of handwritten pamphlets by the political convicts. Even the
office of the Secretary of State for India later accepted that certain grievances of the
hunger strikers were remedied after the hunger strike ended and that it was difficult to
say «convincingly» that the hunger strike was «without justification» or might not have
been avoided especially if they made representations before threatening to strike. It was
also admitted that the hunger strike was not «properly handled» by the authorities and
that the jail superintendent who was ‘nervous’ of terrorist prisoners was not very good at
dealing with them97.
47 The termination of the hunger strike did not bring any change in the transportation
policy  of  the  Government  of  India  and the  transportation of  the  convicts,  including
political convicts, continued to be in practice till June 193798. But the cellular jail was no
more a hell  for political prisoners.  A tremendous change also had taken place in the
political  atmosphere  of  India.  The  militant  nationalist  movement  had  receded to  its
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lowest ebb, and in pursuance of the Government of India Act 1935 autonomy was granted
to  Indian  provinces.  In  the  provincial  elections  of  January  1937  the  Indian  National
Congress won clear majority in the six provinces. When the Congress Ministries were
formed in March 1937 one of their first measures was the release of political prisoners in
their respective provinces. This prompted political prisoners in the cellular jail to resort
to  another  hunger  strike  to  press  for  their  release  and  for  the  abandonment  of
transportation of political prisoners. On July 24, 1937, 187 political prisoners of Cellular
Jail  undertook the  fourth and last  hunger  strike  while  72  struck  work.  This  was  an
altogether different kind of hunger strike and did not meet with repressive measures
from the jail authorities99. Later, Mahatma Gandhi intervened and an agreement between
him  and  Viceroy  Lord  Linlithgow  paved  the  way  for  the  release  of  those  terrorist
prisoners ready to give an undertaking not to engage in violent activities for the future.
48 The terrorist prisoners at the penal settlement were ultimately transferred in phases to
mainland prisons100. The  last  batch of  109  terrorist  prisoners  left  Andamans  on 18th
January 1938101. Even after the termination of the threat of political militancy convicts
continued to be transported from mainland prisons on a voluntary basis to provide a
labour force up to 1942102. Transportation was terminated, in practice, only during Second
World War when Japanese forces captured the Andamans on 23rd March 1942. The victory
of the Allies leading to the surrender of Japan on 15th August 1945 paved the way for the
reoccupation of these Islands by the British forces in October 1945. In the meantime the
Home Department of the Government of India had recommended the closure of the penal
settlement103.  Penal  settlement  was  abolished  and  a  free  pardon  was  granted  to  all
convicts.  The  colonial  policy  of  maintaining  a  penal  settlement  at  Andaman  Islands
terminated with the transfer of power from London to New Delhi.
 
Conclusion
49 Even from behind prison walls nationalist prisoners presented a well-determined political
resistance  to  colonial  administration  through  mass  hunger  strikes.  This  technique
exposed the discriminatory treatment of political prisoners and fanned public opinion
against the colonial regime. The colonial administration evaluated such hunger strikes as
mere insubordination, which was to be discouraged by a refusal to make concessions. The
timing to the 45-day hunger strike of May-June 1933 by around 55 militant prisoners
coincided with the comparative lull in the arena of national struggle. After the conclusion
of the second Round Table Conference in 1931, the government was busy formulating the
Government of India Act. Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement of 1930-1931 had been
called off and all the political parties in India were waiting for the government to finalise
a new constitution. The tide of militancy was also ebbing when the news of the hunger
strike at the Andaman Islands revitalised the political atmosphere.
50 To meet the challenge of nationalist prisoners the jail administration adopted a number
of measures including the isolation of each hunger striker and the coercive option of
«forced feeding». The legal system sanctioned this on the principle of «safe custody», an
obligation to protect the lives of prisoners in its custody. A tortuous method of «forced
feeding» was devised by the jail administration. However, the death of three prisoners
due to the negligence of jail authorities put government on the defensive. It had to satisfy
agitated queries from the members of the Council and to provide a rational justification
of its policies regarding transportation and treatment of political prisoners in the cellular
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jail. The decision to send Lt. Col. Barker from Punjab was in itself an acknowledgement of
the failure of  jail  authorities to deal  with the hunger strike.  Despite Barker’s tactics,
which included a reduction of the number of feeds the hunger strike continued for a
further twelve days.  The jail  authorities even failed to stop the leakage of news,  the
deaths which led to mass protests and demonstrations on the mainland.  The hunger
strike defeated the colonial policy of segregating «dangerous» ideas. Though government
claimed  that  the  hunger  strike  was  abandoned  unconditionally,  in  fact  the  colonial
government  had to  amend the  existing  rules  and redress  the  grievances  of  political
prisoners. This hunger strike was the last milestone in the history of militant resistance
to colonial rule which forced a stubborn colonial bureaucracy to yield and destroyed the
dread image of «black waters» – the penal settlement at the Andaman Islands.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 
Books and memoirs
Mathur, L. P., History of the Andaman Islands, 1756-1966, Delhi, Sterling Publication, 1968.
Mathur, L. P., Kala Pani: History of Andaman and Nicobar Islands with a Study of India’s Freedom
Struggle, Delhi, Eastern book corporation, 1985.
Majumdar, R. C., Penal Settlement in Andamans, New Delhi, Gazetteers unit, Department of Culture,
Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Publication Division, 1975.
Savarkar, V. D., The Story of my Transportation for Life (English translation by Professor V. N. Naik),
Bombay, Sadbhakti Publications. 1950.
Sen, S., Disciplining Punishment: Colonialism and Convict Society in the Andaman Islands, Oxford,
Oxford U.P., 2000.
Sinha, B. K., In Andamans: The Indian Bastille, Prafulla C. Mitra, 24/30, The Mall, Cawnpore, 1939.
Singh, U. K., Political Prisoners in India, Oxford, Oxford U.P., 1998.
Tendulkar, D. G., Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, vol. 1, 1869-1920, New Delhi,
Publication Division, Government of India, 1951.
Verma, S., Sansmritiyan (The memoirs), Lucknow, Martyrs Memorial and Freedom Struggle
Research Center 1991.
 
India office records and library London
L/P&J Series- Collection 115, 115/1A and 115/1AA (Jails and Reformatories, Andaman and
Nicobar Islands: Use as penal settlement and reports of Chief Commissioner).
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
16
Jnanananda, S., Hunger strike and death of the political prisoners in the Andamans, A booklet sent from
S. C. Mitra, President, Andaman Prisoner’s relief League, 37, Serpentine Lane, Calcutta, 11th June
1933 to Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, London.
 
Unpublished project reports
Srivastava, P. K., Oral history of freedom struggle with special reference to ex-Andaman freedom fighters,
1921-1947, an unpublished report submitted to the Indian Council of Historical Research (New
Delhi) and Martyrs Memorial and Freedom Struggle Research Center (Lucknow), 1992.
Srivastava, P. K., Oral history of freedom struggle with special reference to ex-Andaman, naval mutiny
and freedom fighters of 1942 movement, unpublished report submitted to Indian Council of Historical
Research (New Delhi) and Martyrs Memorial and Freedom Struggle Research Center (Lucknow),
1998.
NOTES
1. The couplet of Pushkin was found scribbled on the first page of the notebook of Mahabir Singh
the first casualty of the hunger strike of 1933 in the cellular jail (Verma, 1991, p. 139).
2. Singh (1998, p. 49).
3. Verma (1991, p. 7).
4. Tendulkar (1951, p. 150).
5. Singh (1998, p. 51).
6. Sen (2000, p. 6).
7. Sen (2000, p. 18).
8. IOR:  Vinayak  Vithal  Kalikar,  Council  of  State  Debates,  11 th September  1933,  p.  246,  P&J
3932/1933.
9. IOR: Terrorist Prisoners in the Andamans, Council of State, 11 th September 1933, p. 251, P&J
3932/1933.
10. Majumdar (1975, p. 148).
11. Singh (1998, p. 51).
12. Singh (1998, pp. 51-52 fn.).
13. Majumdar (1975, p. 201).
14. Sen (2000, p. 265).
15. IOR: Terrorist Prisoners in the Andamans, Council of State, 11 th September 1933, p. 251, P&J
3932/1933.
16. IOR: Minute Paper, P&J 5339/1932.
17. IOR: Extract from Chapter XVII of Interim Report of the General Purposes Sub – Committee of
the Retrenchment Advisory Committee, December 1931, Part II, Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
18. Majumdar (1975, p. 281).
19. IOR: Jail policy in the Andaman, Summary for Council, From Home Department, Government
of India, D. O. No. 111/44-Jails, 21st August 1945, To J.P. Gibson, Secretary, Political Department,
India Office, P&J 8496/1945.
20. IOR: Report of the discussion between the Government of India and the Governor of Bengal,
P&J 2824.
21. IOR: Minute Paper, 7.6.32, Public and Judicial Department, P&J 5339/1932.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
17
24. IOR: Minute Paper, P&J 5339/1932.
25. IOR: Telegram 2544, Home Department, dated 15th November 1932, P&J 5588 of 1932.
26. IOR: Legislative Assembly Debates, 14 November 1932, pp. 1975-1976.
27. IOR: See Express letters from Joint Secretary to the Government of India Simla/New Delhi to
Secretary of State for India, P&J 1932 to 1937.
28. IOR: Council of State Debates, 4th March 1933, p. 123, P&J 1184/1933.
29. IOR:  From  Home  Department  Government  of  India,  Simla,  the  25 th May  1933,  No.  19/
F.11/1/33-jails  to  His  Majesty’s  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  Public  and  Judicial
department, India Office, London, P&J 2239/1933.
30. Ibid.
31. IOR: Extract from the Report on the Administration of the Police in Bihar and Orissa for the
year 1930, Enclosure, Home Department, Government of India, and D.O.No. D. 9061/32-Poll, the
28th November 1932,P&J 5876/1932.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. IOR: To Secretary of State, telegram 3rd November 1932, No. 2457, P&J 5339/32.
35. IOR: Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, 12 th November 1932,
No. 2943, P&J 5339/32.
36. Ibid.
37. IOR: List of political prisoners whose removal to the Cellular Jail at Port Blair, between August
1932 and April 1933, was ordered by the Governor-General in Council under section 29(1) of the
Prisoners Act (III of 1900) as amended by Act I of 1903, from Home Department Government of
India, Simla, the 25th May 1933, No. 19/F.11/1/33-Jails to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of State
for India, Public and Judicial department, India Office, London, P&J 2239/1933.
38. Ibid. Three political prisoners -Ramendra Narayan Biswas and Madan Mohan Roy Choudhury
from Bengal and Ishwar Dayal Singh from Bihar and Orissa- were not deported by then. The two
other prisoners -Birendra Nath Roy and Mukul Ranjan Sen Gupta from Bengal- were returned to
Central Jail, Alipore Calcutta, on account of their ill health (IOR: Jnanananda, p. 2).
39. IOR: Minute Paper, P&J 5339/1932.
40. IOR:  Jnanananda  (1931,  p. 1)  (published  also  in  the  «Amrit  Bazar  Patrika»,  «Advance»,
«Liberty»,  «Anand Bazar Patrika»,  «Bangabani» of  Calcutta,  «Bombay Chronicle»,  «Free Press
Journal» of Bombay, «Hindu» of Madras etc.).
41. Srivastava (1992, Appendix VII).
42. IOR: Report On the Medical Aspects of the Hunger strike in the Cellular Jail, Port Blair, From
Lieut.  -F.A.Barker,  O.B.E.,  I.M.S.,  Inspector-General  of  Prisons,  Punjab to the Secretary to The
Government  of  India,  Home  Department,  Simla,  June  22nd 1933,  From  Home  Department,
Government of India, No. 26/F.70/4B/32-Jails to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of State for India,
India Office, London, the 27th July 1933, P&J 3026/1933.
43. Ibid.
44. Srivastava (1992, Appendix VII).
45. Sinha (1939, pp. 32-39).
46. IOR: list of political prisoners whose removal to the Cellular Jail at Port Blair, between August
1932 and April 1933, was ordered by the Governor-General in Council under section 29(1) of the
Prisoners Act (III of 1900) as amended by Act I of 1903, from Home Department Government of
India, Simla, the 25th May 1933, No. 19/F.11/1/33-Jails to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of State
for India, Public and Judicial department, India Office, London, P&J 2239/1933].
47. Srivastava (1998, p. 48).
48. Srivastava (1992, Appendix VI).
49. Srivastava (1998, p. 38).
50. Srivastava (1998, p. 47).
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
18
51. IOR:  From Home Department,  Government of  India to Secretary of  State for India,  dated
Simla, 7th June 1933 No. 1417, repeating telegram from Andamans, June 5 th for information, P&J
2210/1933.
52. The Government of India informed the Secretary of State: «29 political convicts in C class,
transported after August 1932» to the Cellular Jail of the Andaman Islands, «at the instigation of
K.B. Dutt» (sic- B.K. Dutta), Lahore conspiracy convict, commenced a hunger-strike on May 12,
1933 «as a protest that their grievances were not being redressed». IOR: From Home Department,
Government  of  India  to  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  dated  Simla,  21st May,  1933  No  1273,
repeating telegram from Andamans, 18st May for information, P&J 1941/1933.
53. Sinha (1939, pp. 39-40).
54. IOR:  From Home Department,  Government of  India to Secretary of  State for India,  dated
Simla, 7th June 1933 No. 1417, repeating telegram from Andamans, June 5 th for information, P&J
2210/1933.
55. Ibid.
56. IOR: Jnanananda (1933, pp. 10-11).
57. Article 1052 of the Jail Code, Ibid. p. 11.
58. Chapter XXXIV, Rule 24, Ibid. p. 11.
59. Chapter XXXIV, Rule 24, Ibid. p. 11. p. 12.
60. Chapter X, Rule 553, Ibid. p. 12. «All money or other articles in respect whereof no order of a
competent court has been made and which may with proper authority be brought into the prison
for his use shall be placed in the custody of the Jailor… any property or money belonging to a
prisoner may at any time during his imprisonment be delivered to his friends with the approval
of the superintendent under an authority signed by the prisoner».
61. Chapter XVII A- Rule 689 B, Ibid. p. 12.
62. Rule 689 A, Ibid. p. 13.
63. Chapter XXXIV- Rule 22 (1), Ibid. p. 13.
64. The amendment was made by the Lt. Governor in Council under the power conferred on him
by section 60 of the Prisons Act, 1894, by the insertion of Rule 100-A in the Bengal Jail Code
whereby force feeding was made legal. Singh (1998, p. 49 f. n.).
65. IOR: From O’Donnell, Secretary to the Government of India to J.E.Ferard, Secretary, Judicial
and Public Department, India Office, Delhi, the 16th November 1922, No. F. 201/XX, Government
of India, Home Department (Political).
66. Ibid. p. 2.
67. IOR: From O’Donnell, Secretary to the Government of India to J.E.Ferard, Secretary, Judicial
and Public Department, India Office, Delhi, the 16th November 1922, No. F. 201/XX, Government
of India, Home Department (Political). pp. 3-4.
68. IOR: Report On the Medical Aspects of the Hunger strike In the Cellular Jail, Port Blair, From
Lieut.  -F.A.Barker,  O.B.E.,  I.M.S.,  Inspector-General  of  Prisons,  Punjab to the Secretary to The
Government  of  India,  Home  Department,  Simla,  June  22nd 1933,  From  Home  Department,
Government of India, No. 26/F.70/4B/32-Jails to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of State for India,
India Office, London, the 27th July 1933, P&J 3026/1933.
69. Srivastava (1992, Appendix 6).
70. IOR: From Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State for India, repeating
telegram of 18th May from Chief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar islands, 21 st May 1933,
No. 1273, P&J 1941 of 1933.
71. IOR:  From  Home  Department,  Government  of  India  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India,
repeating telegram of May 20th from Chief  Commissioner,  Andaman and Nicobar Islands,  No.
1325, 28th May 1933, P&J 2064/1933.
72. Ibid.
73. IOR: Vinayak Vithal Kalikar, Council of State, 11th September 1933, P&J 3932/1933.
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
19
74. Srivastava (1998, p. 38).
75. IOR: From Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State for India, repeating
telegram of 26th May from Chief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar islands, 28 th May 1933,
No. 1325, P&J 2064 of 1933.
76. IOR:  From Home Department,  Government of  India to Secretary of  State for India,  dated
Simla, 7th June 1933 No. 1417, repeating telegram from Andamans, June 5 th for information, P&J
2210/1933.
77. IOR: Vinayak Vithal Kalikar, Council of State, 11th September 1933, P&J 3932/1933.
78. IOR: Press Communiqué issued by Home Department, Simla, the 31st May 1933, Enclosure No.
1, From Home Department, Government of India, No. 21/F.70/4-B/32-Jails, to His Majesty’s Under
Secretary of State for India, London, Simla, the 19th June 1933, P&J 2445/1933.
79. IOR: Press Communiqué issued by Home Department, Simla, the 31st May 1933, Enclosure No.
2,  From  Home  Department,  Government  of  India,  No.  21/F.70/4-B/32-Lails,  to  His  Majesty’s
Under Secretary of State for India, London, Simla, the 19th June 1933, P&J 2445/1933.
80. IOR: Jnanananda (1933, p. 14).
81. IOR:  From Home Department,  Government of  India to Secretary of  State for India,  dated
Simla, 7th June 1933 No. 1417, repeating telegram from Andamans, June 5 th for information, P&J
2210/1933.
82. IOR: Press Communiqué issued by Home Department, Simla, the 7th June, 1933, Enclosure No.
3,  From  Home  Department,  Government  of  India,  No.  21/F.70/4-B/32-Lails,  to  His  Majesty’s
Under Secretary of State for India, London, Simla, the 19th June 1933, P&J 2445/1933. Lieutenant
Colonel Barker sailed from Madras on June 11.
83. IOR:  Press  Communiqué issued by Home Department,  Simla,  the 13.6.1933,  pp.  1-2,  From
Home  Department,  Government  of  India,  No.  21/F.70/4-B/32-Lails, to  His  Majesty’s  Under
Secretary of State for India, London, Simla, the 19th June 1933, P&J 2445/1933.
84. Ibid.
85. IOR:  Press  communiqué issued by Home Department,  Simla,  13.6.33,  pp.  2-5,  From Home
Department, Government of India, No. 21/F.70/4-B/32- Jails, To His Majesty’s Under Secretary of
State for India, London, Simla, the 19th June 1933, P&J 2445/1933.
86. IOR: Vinayak Vithal Kalikar, Council of State, 11th September 1933, P&J3932/1933.
87. IOR: list of political prisoners whose removal to the Cellular Jail at Port Blair, between August
1932 and April 1933, was ordered by the Governor-General in Council under section 29(1) of the
Prisoners Act (III of 1900) as amended by Act I of 1903, from Home Department Government of
India, Simla, the 25th May 1933, No. 19/F.11/1/33-Jails to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of State
for India, Public and Judicial department, India Office, London, P&J 2239/1933].
88. IOR: Report On the Medical Aspects of the Hunger strike In the Cellular Jail, Port Blair, From
Lieut.  -F.A.Barker,  O.B.E.,  I.M.S.,  Inspector-General  of  Prisons,  Punjab to the Secretary to The
Government  of  India,  Home  Department,  Simla,  June  22nd 1933,  From  Home  Department,
Government of India, No. 26/F.70/4B/32-Jails to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of State for India,
India Office, London, the 27th July 1933, P&J 3026/1933. All subsequent quotations pertaining to
Barker’s report are taken from this source.
89. In fact, when Lt.Col.Barker arrived he found 55 prisoners on hunger-strike but in his report
he included also the three who had died.
90. IOR: Communiqué, dated Simla, the 27th June 1933, P&J 3932 of 1933.
91. IOR: Sir Harry Haig, Council of State, 11th September 1933, P&J 3932/1933.
92. Srivastava (1998, pp. 48-49).
93. Sinha (1939, p. 42).
94. IOR:  See  Rules  framed by  the  Chief  Commissioner,  Andaman and Nicobar  Islands,  under
section  60  of  the Prisons  Act  1894  to  regulate  the  classification  and  treatment  of  convicted
Resistance and repression in India: the hunger strike at the Andaman cellular...
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2003
20
prisoners, 8th January 1934, Statement laid on the Table, 16th February 1934, Extract from Official
Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates, p. 926.
95. IOR: Vinayak Vithal Kalikar, Council of State, 11th September 1933, P&J 3932/1933.
96. Srivastava (1998, pp. 35, 48-49, 69, 72.)
97. IOR: Minute Paper, Debate in Council of State, Hunger strike of Terrorist Prisoner, Andaman
Cellular Jail, Received P&J Dept 31Oct 1933, P&J 3932/1933).
98. IOR: Express letters from Joint Secretary to the Government of India Simla/New Delhi to
Secretary of State for India, P&J 1932 to 1937.
99. IOR: Draft note to the Cabinet, P&J 3784/37.
100. IOR: From Joint Secretary to the Government of India to His Majesty’s Under Secretary of
State for India, Public and Judicial Department, dated New Delhi 14 January 1938, P&J 359 of 1938,
No. F. 5/1/38-Jails, GOI, Home Department).
101. IOR: Telegram from Home Department Government of India to the Secretary of State, No. F.
5/14/37-Jails dated 7th January 1938.
102. IOR: Summary For Council: Jail policy in the Andamans, From Home Department, Government
of India, D. O. No. 111/44- Jails, darted the 21st August 1945, J.P. Gibson, Political Department,
India Office, POL 8496/1945, pp. 1-2.)
103. Ibid.
ABSTRACTS
The rise of militancy in the beginning of twentieth century in India made the colonial authorities
apprehensive  of  confining  the  nationalists  on  the  mainland  where  they  could  spread  their
«dangerous ideas». The hunger strikes by the political convicts in the mainland prisons and in
the cellular jail were an extension of the resistance movement against British colonialism. At the
cost of three lives the hunger strike of 1933 kept the spirit of anti-colonial struggle alive during
the lull created after Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience Movement and exposed the mistreatment of
political  prisoners  and  the  dehumanisation  involved  in  forced  feeding.  The  narratives  of
participants  put  together  with  government  records  unearths  a  minor  resistance  movement
against a mighty colonial power.
La montée du militantisme en Inde au début du XXe siècle fit craindre aux autorités coloniales
que si les nationalistes étaient internés sur le continent, ils pourraient propager leurs «idées
dangereuses». Les grèves de la faim des détenus politiques dans les prisons continentales et dans
la prison cellulaire étaient une extension du mouvement de résistance contre le colonialisme
britannique. Au prix de trois vies, la grève de la faim de 1933 maintint l’esprit de la lutte anti-
coloniale  durant  la  période  de  creux  consécutive  au  mouvement  de  désobéissance  civile  de
Gandhi.  Elle  mit  en lumière  les  mauvais  traitements  infligés  aux prisonniers  politiques  et  la
déshumanisation qu’impliquait le fait de les nourrir de force. Les récits des participants et les
archives officielles permettent de mettre en lumière un micro-mouvement de résistance opposé
à une puissance coloniale majeure.
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